(Yes, it’s schoolwork again. Sorry. )

In her article Virtue Theory And Abortion, Rosalind Hursthouse gives a basic introduction to her understanding of virtue ethics, answers some common objections to virtue ethics, then presents her virtue theory analysis of the issue of abortion.
It is that analysis that I will address in this paper as it bears directly on the case presented.
In my opinion, based on my reading of the article, Rosalind Hursthouse would not support abortion in the case presented because none of the possible justifications (worries about Rebecca and Tobias’ future careers, whether or not they are ready to raise a child, the fact that Tobias would have to forgo returning to his home country, etc.) represent a virtuous motivation, either in general or in reference to specific virtues such as courage, kindness, and knowledge, to abort.
I will stress at the outset that this is not because, in her analysis, Hursthouse comes to a firm deontological conclusion about the morality of abortion. Virtue theory, like utilitarianism, is too situationally sensitive to allow for such rigid moral analysis.
However, I think that she makes her opinion of abortion in circumstances like those of Rebecca and Tobias clear when she says :

…to think of abortion as nothing more than the killing of something does not matter, or as nothing but the exercise of some right or rights one has, or as the incidental means to some desirable state of affairs, is to do something callous and light-minded, the sort of thing that no virtuous and wise person would do. (Emphasis is mine. )

This passage seems to suggest that Hurst considers one of the tests to determine whether or not abortion is right in a particular case is whether or not the abortion would be performed merely to create a desired state of affairs. We can therefore conclude that, since that is in essence what every abortion seeks to do, and given her other comments about how abortion cannot be treated as trivial or unimportant, her position is that abortions need to be justified by default.
Two potential justifications she mentions are if a woman is in very poor physical health (whether from a great deal of childbearing or something else) and if the woman is forced to do heavy physical labour on a daily basis. Neither of these apply to Rebecca and Tobias.
Nor does Hursthouse’s example of people in circumstances of marginal survival where having another mouth to feed might mean the death of many adult members of one’s community.
Then we come to the issue of having an abortion in order to pursue another worthwhile activity. One could certainly say that my theory of her opinion is inconsistent with the knowledge that Rebecca plans to become a human rights lawyer, a noble career none but the most callous could view as anything less than worthwhile.
But that alone cannot be said to overcome the “merely to achieve some desirable state” objection. The case provides no information on whether or not that dream is realistic, or whether she will succeed, and if she succeeds, if she will be a good human rights lawyer or not. Such a string of uncertainties surely dilutes (but does not destroy) the moral value of her intentions.
And even if we were to accept that, were she to abort, she is bound by destiny to be an excellent human rights lawyer who will improve the world by a significant degree, it is by no means certain that bringing a child to term will make said outcome impossible or unreasonably difficult. Countless women have brought babies to term while achieving and pursuing high powered careers. We have no reason to believe that Rebecca cannot do the same.
Then there is the fact that Rebecca does not feel ready to be a mother. I understand that very few parents do feel ready, and the ones that do later admit that they were wrong. Human reproduction has always been a leap of faith that requires a great deal of “building the ground you’re walking on”, as it were, and so a mere vague feeling of unpreparedness cannot be said to justify abortion, at least not in an ethical system which says that, whether or not the fetus is a person, abortion is a serious decision that is, in some sense, the ending of a life.

The fact that the premature termination of a pregnancy is, in some sense, the cutting off of a new human life, and thereby, like the procreation of a new human life, connects with all our thoughts of human life and death, parenthood, and family relationships, must make it a serious matter. (Emphasis is mine. )

Therefore, because the case meets none of the specific conditions defined by Hursthouse in the article and the article makes it clear that Hursthouse believes that abortion is a serious matter that requires specific justification, I think Hursthouse would not consider abortion a virtuous act in our specific case.

And that’s all he wrote. I am rather proud of my work there, not just because I think I am right *duh), but by how well behaved I was in writing it.

I didn’t criticize virtue theory, even though I think it’s a heap of elaborate nonsense whose real function is to give you a way to sound like you are thinking wise and heavy thoughts that just happen to lead to the exact same conclusion you would have made without it.

I didn’t get into my own feelings on abortion, even though, as you know, I’m agin it. If it’s a baby when she wants it, it’s a baby when she doesn’t, too. To me, the real battle is against unwanted pregnancy, but until that battle is won, there is no excuse to kill a baby, inside the womb or out.

I didn’t even include language designed to deliberately goad my prof in ways that I could easily deny.

Trust me, by my standards, that makes me a freaking saint.

I will talk to you nice people again tomorrow.